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Partner accountable as a fiduciary. Every partner 
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and hold as trustee for it any profits, derived by 
him without the consent of the other partners from 
any transaction connected with the formation, 
conduct or liquidation of the partnership or from 
any use by him of its property. 
This section applies also to the representatives of 
a deceased partner engaged in the liquidation of 
the affairs of the partnership as the personal 
representatives of the last surviving partner. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 §48-2-9 . . 
Rights, powers and liabilities of a general 
partner. A general partner shall have all the 
rights and powers, and be subject to all the 
restrictions and liabilities, of a partner in a 
partnership without limited partners, except that 
without the written consent or ratification of the 
specific act by all the limited partners, a general 
partner or all of the general partners have no 
author i ty to: 
(1) Do any act in contravention of the 
cer t i fi cate. 
(2) Do any act which would make it 
impossible to carry on the ordinary 
business of the partnership. 
(3) Confess a judgment against the 
partnership. 
(4) Possess partnership property, or 
assign their rights in specific 
partnership property, for other than a 
partnership purpose. 
(5) Admit a person as a general partner. 
(6) Admit a person as a limited partner, 
unless the right so to do is given in the 
cer t i f i cate. 
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(7) Continue the business with 
partnership property on the death, 
retirement or insanity of a general 
partner, unless the right so to do is 
given in the certificate. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 §48-2 - 10( 1) (c ) 2 
Rights of a limited partner. (1) A limited 
partner shall have the same rights as a general 
partner to: 
(c) Have dissolution and winding up by 
decree of cour t. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 §48-2-26 2,12,13,14,21,22,23,24 
26,30,32,33,34,35,36,39,43,44 
Parties to actions. A contributor, unless he is a 
general partner, is not a proper party to 
proceedings by or against a partnership, except 
where the object is to enforce a limited partner's 
right against or liability to the partnership. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 §68-3-1 20 
Common law adopted. The common law of England so 
far as it is not repugnant to, or in conflict with, 
the constitution or laws of the United States, or 
the constitution or laws of this state, and so far 
only as it is consistent with and adapted to the 
natural and physical conditions of this state and 
the necessities of the people hereof, is hereby 
adopted, and shall be the rule of decision in all 
courts of this state. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 §78-12-35 23 
Effect of absence from state. If when a cause of 
action accrues against a person when he is out of 
the state, the action may be commenced within the 
term herein limited after his return to the state; 
and if after a cause of action accrues he departs 
from the state, the time of his absence is not part 
of the time limited for the commencement of the 
action. 
vi i i 
Page 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23.1 (1953) 16,26 
DERIVATIVE ACTIONS BY SHAREHOLDERS 
In a derivative action brought by one or more 
shareholders or members to enforce a right of a 
corporation or of an unincorporated association, ; 
the corporation or association having failed to 
enforce a right which may properly be asserted by 
it, the complaint shall be verified and shall 
allege (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or 
member at the time of the transaction of which he 
complains or that his share or membership 
thereafter devolved on him by operation of law, and 
(2) that the action is not a collusive one to 
confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States 
which it would not otherwise have. The complaint 
shall also allege with particularity the efforts, 
if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action 
he desires from the directors or comparable 
authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders 
or members, and the reasons for his failure to 
obtain the action or for not making the effort. 
The derivative action may not be maintained if it 
appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the 
shareholders or members similarly situated in 
enforcing the rights of the corporations of the 
corporation or association. The action shall not 
be dismissed or compromised without the approval of 
the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or 
compromise shall be given to shareholders or 
members in such manner as the court directs. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b) 2 
(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims And/Or Involving 
Multiple Parties. When more than one claim for 
relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, 
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment 
as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims 
or parties only upon an express determination by 
the court that there is no just reason for delay 
and upon an express direction for the entry of 
judgment. In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of decision, 
however designated, which adjudicates fewer than 
all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
ix ( 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the 
action as to any of the claims or parties, and the 
order or other form of decision is subject to 
revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all the parties. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
1. Do the provisions of §48-2-26 U.C.A. (1953) abrogate the 
conmon law right of a limited partner to sue derivatively to 
protect or enforce the rights of the partnership where the 
general partner refuses to act because of a conflict of interest. 
i 
i 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order certified pursuant to 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure from the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Summit County, State of Utah, 
Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge. All defendants except Associated 
Title Company joined in the Motion of the lenders, Virginia Beach 
Federal Savings & Loan, Guaranty Northstate, Atlantic Permanent 
Federal and Jefferson Savings & Loan, to dismiss plaintiffs 1 
Verified Complaint before issue was joined. The defendants claim 
that the plaintiffs 1 Complaint failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted because Section 48-2-26, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) prohibits limited partners in a limited 
partnership from suing derivatively to protect the interests of 
the partnership, even where the general partner fails or refuses 
to protect the interests of the partnership. 
The Motion was decided solely upon the allegations of the 
Complaint and the authority cited in memoranda and argument of 
the parties and without the aid of affidavits, depositions or 
other discovery. The Order of Dismissal entered by the court, 
appended hereto as Appendix A, reflects the ruling of the 
court. The trial court held that the statutory authority cited 
above must be interpreted to prohibit the right of limited 
partners to sue derivatively on behalf of the limited 
partnership. As the Order dismissed all derivative claims filed 
by plaintiffs on behalf of the limited partnership, the plaintiff 
sought and obtained Rule 54(b) certification of the derivative 
-2-




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As relevant here, the gravamen of the plaintiffsT Verified 
Complaint is that the general partner of The Jeremy, Ltd, has 
breached the fiduciary duties it owes the limited partnership, 
and that it is unwilling to initiate action to protect the 
partnership because to do so would require that it sue itself and 
the various financial institutions that control it. These 
assertions are based upon the following factual allegations, 
which, for the purpose of this appeal from an order of dismissal, 
must be accepted as true. See, Murray v. City of Milford, 
Connnecticut, 380 F.2d 468, 470 (2nd Cir. 1967). All of the 
following citations refer to paragraphs of the Verified Complaint 
as paginated in the Record on Appeal. 
The Jeremy, Ltd. is a Utah limited partnership. Paragraph 
1, R. p.2. The Jeremy, Ltd. was formed by plaintiffs Gerald H. 
Bagley and Bagley Corporation in order to develop certain 
property situate in Morgan and Summit Counties, State of Utah. 
This development is known as The Jeremy Ranch. Gerald H. Bagley 
was the original general partner of The Jeremy, Ltd. Paragraph 
17, R. p.5. Additionally, Gerald H. Bagley and Bagley Corp. 
(hereinafter collectively known as "plaintiffs") own 
approximately 75% of the limited partnership interests of The 
Jeremy, Ltd. Paragraph 15, R. p.4. 
In 1982, The Jeremy, Ltd. required capital to pay off the 
loan with which the partnership property was initially purchased 
and to fund the construction and development of The Jeremy 
-4-
Ranch. Paragraph 24, R. p.6. Through a series of negotiations 
conducted through Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Company, The Jeremy, 
Ltd. eventually reached an agreement with Virginia Beach Federal 
Savings <5c Loan, Guaranty Northstate, Atlantic Permanent Federal, 
and Jefferson Savings and Loan (hereinafter collectively referred 
to as "lenders") for a loan of $12,500,000.00. This loan was 
secured by a first deed of trust encumbering substantially all of 
the property of the partnership. Paragraphs 25-27, R. pp. 6-7. 
The lenders issued a formal commitment letter concerning the loan 
in August, 1982, and represented that the loan would close within 
three to six weeks thereafter. Paragraphs 27-30, R. p.7. The 
lenders required that a 5% loan fee ($625,000.00) be paid at the 
time the commitment letter was issued, even though the actual 
loan had not closed. Paragraphs 28, 31, R. p.7. In order to 
meet this demand of the lenders, Gerald H. Bagley and The Jeremy, 
Ltd. executed a promissory note payable to the lenders or their 
designees in the amount of $625,000.00. Paragraph 30, R. p.7. 
In reliance upon the lenders1 repeated representations that 
the loan would soon close and the loan funds would then be 
available, plaintiffs made commitments to contractors and 
commenced construction. Paragraphs 27, 30, 36, R. pp. 7-8. 
However, the loan did not close until December, 1982. Paragraph 
31, R. p.7. At this point, plaintiffs were at risk on the 
$625,000.00 note and had been incurring debt in order to maintain 
construction through the fall of 1982. Paragraphs 28, 36-37, R. 
pp. 7-8 . 
The lenders knew that the repayment schedule and other 
information used to qualify for the loan were based upon the 
assumption that the loan would close and fund in August, 1982. 
Paragraphs 32-34, R. pp.7-8. When the loan documents were 
finally presented to the plaintiffs, the lenders1 delay had 
already forced the plaintiffs into a position where they had no 
economic choice but to execute the documents because of the 
commitments they had made with contractors and because of 
plaintiffs' liability on the note that had been executed in order 
to pay the commitment fee. This position was the result of the 
lenders' delay in closing the loan, contrary to earlier 
representations the lenders had made to plaintiffs. No 
negotiation of the loan documents was permitted by the lenders. 
Paragraphs 38-39, R. p.8. 
After the loan closed in December, 1982, the lenders further 
delayed and inhibited the development of the project and thus 
plaintiffs1 ability to perform under the terms of the loan 
agreement by intentionally and wrongfully delaying the funding of 
construction draws that the lenders were obligated to pay. From 
July, 1983 through February, 1984, the lenders repeatedly delayed 
paying valid and proper draws on the construction loan. 
Paragraphs 44-48, R. pp.9-10. 
Because of the repeated and wrongful delays by the lenders 
in performing their obligations, many of the contractors working 
on the project were not paid, and subsequently stopped work. 
This caused additional delays and expenses in the completion of 
the project. Paragraph 45, R. p.9. The lenders were fully aware 
that the delays caused by them in completion of improvements were 
-6-
delaying and inhibiting the ability of the plaintiffs to sell 
Jeremy Ranch lots, upon which timely repayment of the loan 
depended. Paragraph 46, R. p.9. 
In February, 1984, the lenders finally funded the draws 
necessary to pay existing contractor debts. Paragraph 48, R. 
p. 10. Unfortunately, by this point it was necessary for the 
plaintiffs to borrow an additional $6.8 million to pay for cost 
overruns, construction, interest and other expenses. Paragraph 
49, R. p.10. 
In the fall of 1984 the lenders (through their agent Causey 
Davis) interfered in the management of The Jeremy, Ltd. by 
demanding that plaintiff Bagley, as general partner, require 
approximately 200 persons who had purchased "reservations" on 
Jeremy Ranch lots to select their lots and pay the balance of 
their obligations within thirty days. Paragraphs 50-51, 55, R. 
pp.10-11. The original terms of the reservation agreements had 
required two payments; $25,000.00 down and $25,000.00 upon 
completion of the lot improvements. The original timetable had 
set completion dates of 1984 for plat IV of the project and 1985 
for plat V, but, as described above, the actions of the lenders 
had made compliance with this schedule impossible. Paragraph 51, 
R. p. 10. The actions of the lenders forced plaintiffs to breach 
their contracts with the various reservation holders. Paragraphs 
56, 58, R. p.11. Plaintiffs and the partnership objected, 
claiming the demands would cause a "run on the bank" by 
disgruntled reservation holders who could demand rescission and 
the return of their $25,000 deposits. Paragraph 57, R. p.11. 
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When plaintiffs objected to the lenders' demands, the lenders 
threatened to call the loans and foreclose on the partnership 
property. Paragraph 58, R. p. 11. The alleged default was 
failure to comply with construction and sales projections. The 
lenders' own conduct in delaying construction draws against the 
loan had contributed to or caused the alleged default. Paragraph 
46, R. p.9. Under protest and duress, plaintiff made the demand 
upon lot reservation holders required by the lenders. The demand 
required The Jeremy, Ltd. to breach the lot reservation 
agreements. As a result of the breach of the reservation 
contracts, numerous reservation holders demanded rescission and 
the return of their reservation deposits: Paragraphs 56-59, R. 
p. 11. The general partner paid rescission demands totalling 
almost $1,000,000.00. The attempt to meet these rescission 
demands exhausted the cash reserves of The Jeremy, Ltd. and 
certain individual partners of The Jeremy, Ltd. including Dr. 
Gerald Bagley. Paragraph 60, R. p.12. 
Because of the actions of the lenders described above and 
adverse weather conditions beyond plaintiffs' control, by 
December, 1984, the resources of The Jeremy, Ltd. were nearly 
exhausted and the construction schedule was even further in 
arrears. Paragraph 64, R. p.12. At this point the lenders, 
under renewed threat of foreclosure, demanded control of The 
Jeremy, Ltd. Paragraph 65, R. p.12. The lenders proposed the 
formation of a new corporation, ultimately known as the Jeremy 
Service Corporation, (hereafter "JSC") which would assume control 
of The Jeremy, Ltd. by replacing Dr. Gerald Bagley as its general 
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partner. Paragraph 66, R. p. 13. In order to quell the 
objections and resistance of the limited partners to the lenders1 
demand for control, the lenders promised that they would perform 
a number of acts for the benefit of the partnership, its partners 
and its creditors. Specifically, the lenders promised that if 
the limited partners approved the JSC scheme, the lenders would 
cause and assist JSC to do the following: 
a. Pay sums owed by The Jeremy, Ltd. to its creditors 
including lot reservation holders and others; 
b. Pay off all contractors who were owed money on the 
project; 
c. Formulate* a development and marketing plan for the 
year 1985 and aggressively market the project and act in its best 
interest so that it could generate funds to repay the loans 
owed to the lenders and others; 
d. Curb and eliminate negative rumors and information 
about the project through a positive public relations program and 
through the timely payment of debts and obligations of The 
Jeremy, Ltd.; 
e. Issue deeds to lots to all those who were entitled 
to them because of payment of purchase price or otherwise (some 
lot reservation holders had elected to purchase their lots 
and had paid or tendered the balances owing but could not 
obtain clear title unless the lenders released their liens 
reflected by the deeds of trust); 
f. Act responsibly and maintain a fiduciary obligation 
to the partnership and its limited partners; 
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g. Maintain the equity and value of The Jeremy, Ltd. 
and the property owned by it; and 
h. Protect the Bagley interests and the interests of 
the limited partners by permitting Gerald Bagley an advisory role 
in the operation of The Jeremy, Ltd. and a seat on the board of 
directors of JSC. Paragraph 67, R. p.13. 
The lenders1 failure to perform according to these covenants 
forms the basis for a number of the claims that the general 
partner of The Jeremy, Ltd. should bring against the lenders. 
Paragraphs 118-120, R. pp. 25-26. Instead, not only has the 
general partner failed to bring these claims, it has 
systematically breached its fiduciary duties to the partnership 
and acted to place the interests of the individual lenders before 
those of the partnership. Paragraphs 74-95, R. pp. 15-20. 
The substitute general partner, JSC, is a transparent alter 
ego of the lenders. The stock of JSC is owned entirely by the 
lenders or their nominees. Its directors are now exclusively 
officers or employees of the lenders, dependent upon the lenders 
for their livelihoods. As such, the board is captive to the will 
of the lenders. Various other officers of the lenders who are 
not directors of JSC sit and participate in its board meetings, 
often making motions or directing the votes of the other 
directors with impugnity. Paragraphs 74-75, R. p. 15. 
The documents that substitute control of the limited 
partnership were drafted by lenders1 counsel, as were the 
documents for the creation of JSC. These documents were not 
negotiable when presented for signature to the partners of the 
-10-
limited partnership. They unconscionably required the limited 
partners to consent to the lendersT demand that the new general 
partner could ignore its fiduciary duty to the partnership and 
its limited partners and act in the best interests of the 
lenders. Paragraphs 69-72, R. p. 14. 
Jeremy Service Corporation as general partner of The Jeremy, 
Ltd. has failed and refused to bring suit against the lenders for 
the acts of the lenders that took place both before and after the 
change of control. Obviously JSC wi11 not sue the lenders. The 
directors of JSC are the officers or employees of the individual 
lenders. JSC is an alter ego of the lenders. It is for this 
reason that plaintiffs have been forced to assert the instant 
derivative claims on behalf of The Jeremy, Ltd. 
Additionally, JSC has failed to assert against itself the 
causes of action that the partnership has against it for breaches 
of the fiduciary duty it owes the partnership. The specific 
facts concerning JSCT s defalcations of duty are set forth at 
paragraph 152 (a)-(i), R. pp. 31-33, of the Verified Complaint. 
The crux of these allegations is that JSC has subordinated the 
interests of the partnership to those of the lenders, and has 
participated in and furthered the lenders' conspiratorial 
attempts to wrongfully obtain the partnership's primary asset, 
the Jeremy Ranch. This failure to protect the partnership's 
interests is a breach of fiduciary duty in and of itself. If the 
plaintiffs are not allowed to assert these claims derivatively, 
the wrongs of the lenders and Jeremy Service Corporation will go 
unredressed. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. A LIMITED PARTNER IN A UTAH LIMITED PARTNERSHIP HAS A 
COMMON LAW RIGHT TO BRING A DERIVATIVE ACTION ON BEHALF OF THE 
PARTNERSHIP WHEN THE GENERAL PARTNER IS UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO DO 
SO, 
A general partner owes a fiduciary duty to the limited 
partnership. If the general partner refuses or is unable to take 
action on behalf of the partnership against itself or third 
parties, in breach of its fiduciary duty, equity provides the 
limited partner a right to sue derivatively in order to protect 
the partnership interests. The source of the derivative right 
lies in the common law doctrine that equity will suffer no right 
to be without a remedy. The right is analogous to the rights of 
a corporate shareholder and a cestui que trust. 
As a part of the common law, the derivative right of a 
limited partner has been adopted as the law of this state unless 
the Legislature has expressly or implicitly stated otherwise. 
II. U.C.A. §48-2-26 (1953) DOES NOT ABROGATE THE COMMON LAW 
RIGHT OF A LIMITED PARTNER TO SUE ON BEHALF OF THE PARTNERSHIP 
WHEN THE GENERAL PARTNER REFUSES OR IS UNABLE TO DO SO. 
The Utah Limited Partnership Act does not expressly prohibit 
the exercise of a limited partner's derivative right. The issue 
before this court is whether U.C.A. §48-2-26 should be construed 
as implicitly barring the derivative action. Section 26 states: 
A contributor, unless he is a general partner, is 
not a proper party to proceedings by or against a 
partnership, except where the object is to enforce 
a limited partners right against or liability to 
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the partnership. 
The court's primary objective in resolving this issue must be to 
give effect to the legislative purpose of the statute. The 
actual purposes of Section 26 were to reaffirm the limited 
liability and removal from management of a limited partner. An 
examination of the history and circumstances surrounding the 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act ("ULPA") compels the conclusion 
that Section 26 was not intended to bar derivative suits by 
limited partners. The drafters of the ULPA did not envisage the 
possible need for a derivative action. Thus, they could not have 
intended Section 26 as a bar to such. 
As Section 26 was not intended to bar derivative actions by 
limited partners, the question becomes whether it was proper to 
so apply it. In this regard, it is recognized that in order to 
give a statute implementation that will fulfill its purpose, 
reason and intention sometimes prevail over technically applied 
1i teralness. , 
Section 26 must be construed in light of and consistently 
with the objective of the ULPA as a whole. The primary purpose 
of the Act was to encourage investment in the limited partnership \ 
form of business entity. If this court construes Section 26 to 
deny limited partners the right to protect the partnership 
against the self-dealing and breaches of fiduciary duty by < 
corporate general partners it will discourage investment in 
limited partnerships and defeat the purpose for which the ULPA 
was enacted in Utah. i 
Statutes presumptively are intended not to produce absurd or 
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inequitable consequences. The legislature could not have 
intended Section 26 to prohibit the enforcement of a general 
partner Ts fiduciary duty to the partnership. The contrary 
conclusion is both absurd, in that it concedes a duty but denies 
the ability to enforce it, and inequitable, in that it leaves the 
partnership without a remedy for injury caused by the general 
partner T s defalcat i ons. 
To interpret Section 26 as a bar to derivative actions will 
expose Utah's limited partners to injury caused by self-dealing, 
undercapitalized corporate general partners. This result runs 
contrary to the court fs duty to interpret laws in ways which will 
best protect the public. 
To hold, consistent with the rules of statutory construction 
considered herein, that Section 26 does not abrogate a limited 
partner's common law derivative right will place Utah among the 
majority of those jurisdictions that have carefully considered 
the issue. The opinions reaching the contrary conclusion have 
failed to consider the issue in any depth. Those opinions have 
little if any persuasive value for this court. 
Finally, the policy arguments commonly made against the 
recognition of the common law right are flawed in that they 
ignore the self-1imiting prerequisite showing of the general 
partner Ts inability or wrongful refusal to bring partnership 
claims. 
The interpretation of U.C.A. §48-2-26 (1953) by the District 
Court was error. Its decision must be reversed and this cause 
remanded for further proceedings. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. A LIMITED PARTNER HAS A COMMON LAW EQUITABLE RIGHT TO 
SUE ON BEHALF OF THE PARTNERSHIP WHEN THE GENERAL PARTNER IS 
UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO PROTECT THE PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS. 
Beginning with the landmark decision of Klebanow 
v. New York Produce Exchange, 344 F.2d 294 (2d 
Cir. 1965), the majority of jurisdictions to have 
considered the issue have concluded that, under 
the common law, a limited partner may bring a 
derivative action against the general partners for 
breach of fiduciary duty in the management of the 
affairs of the partnership if the general partners 
refuse or are unable to bring such an action. 
Moore v. 1600 Downing St., Ltd., 668 P.2d 16, 19 (Colo.App.1983) 
(emphasis original) ci ting, Riviera Congress Associates v. 
Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 277 N.Y.S.2d 386, 223 N.E.2d 876 (1966); 
McCully v. Radack, 27 Md.App. 350, 340 A.2d 374 (1975); Smith v. 
Bader, 458 F.Supp. 1184 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (applying California law); 
Strain v. Seven Hills Associates, 75 A.D.2d 360, 429 N.Y.S.2d 424 
(1980) (applying Ohio law); Engl v. Berg, 511 F.Supp. 1146 
(E.D.Pa.1981); Phillips v. KULA 200, Wick Realty, Inc., 629 P.2d 
119 (Haw.App. 1981) ; Jaffe v. Harris, 109 Mich.App. 786, 312 
N.W.2d 381 (1981). 
The basis of the right of a limited partner to bring a 
derivative action when the general partners are unable or 
unwilling to protect the partnership's (and thus, indirectly, the 
limited partner's) interests lies in the well-established 
principle that "equity will suffer no right to be without a 
remedy." See, Chantler v. Wood, 6 Ariz.App. 134, 430 P.2d 713, 
supp'd 6 Ariz.App. 325, 432 P.2d 469 (1967); Stephanus v. 
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Anderson, 26 Wash.App. 326, 613 P.2d 533 (1980); 27 Am.Jur.2d 
"Equity" §120, p. 647 (1966). A general partner in a limited 
partnership is accountable to the partnership as a fiduciary. 
U.C.A. §48-1-18 (1953) (applied to general partners in a limited 
partnership by U.C.A. §48-2-9 (1953)): See also, Burke v. 
Farrell, 656 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Utah 1982) (with respect to general 
partnership); Elk River Associates v. Huskin, 691 P.2d 1148 
(Colo.App.1984); Phillips v. KULA 200, Wick Realty, Inc., 2 
Haw.App. 206, 629 P.2d 119 (1981). The existence of this 
fiduciary duty places the limited partners of the partnership in 
a position similar to that of a preferred stockholder in a 
corporation or the beneficiary of a trust vis-a-vis the corporate 
management or the trustee. Though neither preferred stockholders 
nor trust beneficiaries ordinarily have the right to participate 
in the management of the corporation or trust, equity provides 
them with a remedy to protect their interests, by protecting the 
corporation or trust when the corporate management or the trustee 
is unable or unwilling to do so. This remedy is the derivative 
action. Utah law recognizes the derivative right in these 
analogous situations. See, e.g., U.R.C.P. 23.1 (1953); Salina 
Canyon Coal Co. v. Klemm, 76 Utah 372, 290 P. 161, 167 (1930); 
Rest. Trusts 2d §282, p. 44 (1959). 
Similarly, equity provides a limited partner with the remedy 
of a derivative action to protect the partnership when the 
general partner is unable or unwilling to do so. In the absence 
of a derivative action under these circumstances, the partnership 
would be powerless to enforce the fiduciary duty owed to it by 
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the general partner. The partnership would have a right with no 
remedy. The derivative action is the only means by which a 
limited partnership can be protected against the defalcations of 
a general partner or against collusion by the general partner 
with third parties or parties that control the general partner of 
the partnershi p. 
The facts in Riviera Congress Assoc, v. Yassky, 223 N.E. 2d. 
at 876, are similar to those at hand and illustrate the need for 
a derivative action in such circumstances. Riviera Congress 
Associates owned a motel in New York City. The general partners 
of Riviera leased the motel to The Yassky Corporation which they 
also owned. The lease was "noncancelable" but could be assigned 
with the consent of the general partners provided the assignee 
assumed all of the tenant Ts obligations. Thus, Riviera was i 
entitled to rental payments on the motel for 20 years, and would 
own a cause of action for this rent if the tenant (Yassky Corp.) 
stopped payment. < 
The subsequent transactions involving the lease are complex, 
but what essentially happened was that the individuals who were 
the general partners of Riviera consented to a series of i 
assignments and subleases of Yassky's leasehold interest in the 
motel. All of these transfers were to corporations or 
partnerships that were controlled and owned by the general ( 
partners of Riviera. None of the tenants could operate the motel 
at a profit. This created a conflict of interest for the general 
partners of Riviera. While they had a fiduciary duty to Riviera ( 
to enforce the lease and procure the monthly rental payments, 
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they owned the tenant which was operating the motel at a 
substantial loss. Thus, they also had an interest in releasing 
the tenant from its obligation on the 20 year lease. Eventually, 
the general partners agreed to an assignment of the lease to a 
corporate subsidiary of Riviera. This put Riviera in possession 
of the motel without an independent tenant. The general partners 
then advised the limited partners that, due to current financial 
losses by the operating lessee, the general partners, on behalf 
of the partnership, had accepted a surrender of the operating 
lease. The limited partners who had previously shared in the 
fixed rental derived from the property thereafter ceased to 
receive any return on their investments. 
Under these facts, the partnership had no remedy unless the 
limited partners were able to sue derivatively to set aside the 
final lease assignment and force the payment of rent. The rental 
obligation ran to Riviera, as landlord, and not to the limited 
partners. Accordingly, the suit for rent had to be brought by 
Riviera or someone entitled to sue on its behalf. The general 
partners would not sue because they were losing more money 
operating the motel than they would obtain from their share of 
the rent as general partners of Riviera. Thus, the derivative 
action was the logical and necessary remedy to enforce the 
partnershipsT rights. See, Id. at 879. 
The facts in the instant case also demonstrate the need for 
a derivative right to provide an effective remedy to the 
partnership for a breach of the duty it is owed. Here, as in 
Rivi era, the general partner is paralyzed from enforcing the 
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rights of the partnership due to a conflict of interest. To 
obtain the redress to which the partnership is entitled, J S C m u s t 
sue itself and the lenders which control it. Without a 
derivative action, the partnership has rights without a remedy. 
While limited partners can sue to enforce their own rights and 
recover personal damages for breach of fiduciary duty by the 
general partner, the partnership's claims, premised upon the same 
facts and circumstances, will not be pursued unless the limited 
partners may sue derivatively on behalf of the partnership. The 
inequity of this scenario is precisely why the majority of modern 
authority recognizes the limited partner's derivative right under 
common law equitable principles. 
As the court noted in Rivi era: 
There can be no question that a managing or 
general partner of a limited partnership is bound 
in a fiduciary relationship with the limited 
partners . . . and that the latter are, therefore, 
cestuis que trustent [sic] . . . . It is 
fundamental to the law of trusts that the cestui s 
have the r ight, "upon the general principles of 
equity" . . . and "independently of [statutory] 
provisions" . . . to sue for the benefit of the 
trust on a cause of action which belongs to the 
trust if "the trustees refuse to perform their 
duty in that respect". 
Id. , at 879. (citations omitted) (brackets in original). The 
court in Ri vi era went on to hold: 
Since its general partners will not sue because 
they are the very persons who would be liable for 
payment of the rent, the limited partners, as 
cestuis que trustent, [sic] should be permitted to 
initiate the necessary legal proceedings on behalf 
of the Syndi cate. 
223 N.E. 2d at 880. 
This holding is on all fours with the situation at hand. Since 
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JSC will not assert the partnership's claims against itself and 
the lenders for which it serves as alter ego, plaintiffs must be 
allowed to do so. 
The other "remedies" available to a limited partner for a 
breach of the general partner Ts fiduciary duty do not eliminate 
the need for a derivative action, particularly in a situation 
such as in the instant case. Arguably, limited partners in 
plaintiffs 1 position could "protect their rights" by causing a 
dissolution and winding up of the partnership. Alternatively, 
the plaintiffs could sue the general partner directly for the 
damages caused them because of the breach of duty. It is 
immediately apparent that neither of these actions benefit the 
partnership. Furthermore, these actions could result in only a 
Pyrrhic victory for the individual limited partners. If, as 
here, the general partner is an undercapitalized corporation, the 
assets of the partnership could be squandered or transferred to 
third parties with impugnity, leaving the limited partners with 
only a "shell" from which to recover. It is critical that the 
limited partners be able to protect the partnership as a viable, 
living entity in and of itself. Thus the derivative right is 
absolutely necessary as an effective means of remedying breaches 
of the duty owed to the partnership and its partners. 
Recognition of this common law, equitable right is entirely 
appropriate under U.C.A. §68-3-1 (1953) which adopts the common 
law "so far as it is not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, or the Constitution or 
laws of this state, and so far only as it is consistent with and 
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adapted to the natural and physical conditions of this state and 
the necessities of the people hereof." _I_d* Therefore, a limited 
partner in a Utah limited partnership has a common law right to 
bring an action on behalf of the partnership when the general 
partner is unable or unwilling to protect the partnerships 
interests. 
In summary, the general partner of a limited partnership 
owes the partnership strict fiduciary duties. The limited 
partners of the partnership are the indirect beneficiaries of 
these duties. If the general partner is unable or unwilling to 
protect the partnership's interests, equity provides the limited 
partners with the right to do so derivatively. This right is 
founded in the common law, and is based upon the principal that 
equity will suffer no right to be without a remedy. Utah 
recognizes the derivative rights of corporate shareholders and 
trust beneficiaries, who are in positions analogous to that of a 
limited partner. Further, Utah has adopted the common law to the 
extent that it is not inconsistent with the federal and state 
Constitutions or laws. Therefore, this Court should recognize 
the equitable right of a limited partner to sue on behalf of the 
partnership when the general partner is unable or unwilling to do 
so. 
II. THE LANGUAGE OF U.C.A. §48-2-26 (1953) SHOULD NOT BE 
READ TO PROHIBIT THE EXERCISE OF A LIMITED PARTNER'S RIGHT TO SUE 
ON BEHALF OF THE PARTNERSHIP WHEN THE GENERAL PARTNER IS UNABLE 
OR UNWILLING TO PROTECT THE PARTNERSHIP'S INTERESTS. 
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While the transcript of the hearing and oral argument on 
defendants 1 motion to dismiss is rather ambiguous, it appears 
that the sole basis for the Order of Dismissal was that Judge 
Daniels believed that the language of U.C.A. §48-2-26 prohibited 
derivative claims by limited partners under any circumstances. 
At page 20, the Court states: "How do you get around the statute 
that says unless you fre a general partner you !re not a proper 
party from proceeding against the buyer of the partnership? I 
don Tt see how you read it any other way." Jjd. , lines 13-16. R. 
p. 414. Similarly, at page 30, Judge Daniels is reported as 
saying, "I can't read this language saying anything else other 
than the limited partner canTt be a -- bring against a 
partnership." jU[., lines 11-13. R. p. 424. For the reasons that 
follow, the Court's interpretation of section 26 as absolutely 
prohibiting a derivative suit by a limited partner was error. 
The Order of Dismissal should be reversed, and the cause remanded 
for further proceedings. 
A. The Rules Of Statutory Construction Preclude A Reading 
Of U.C.A. §48-2-26 (1953) That Prohibits Limited Partners From 
Exercising The Common Law Right To Bring A Derivative Action When 
The General Partner Is Unable Or Unwilling To Sue On Behalf Of 
The Partnership. 
A contributor, unless he is a general partner, is 
not a proper party to proceedings by or against a 
partnership, except where the object is to enforce 
a limited partner's right against or liability to 
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the partnership. U.C.A. §48-2-26 (1953) 
In determining whether this provision bars the exercise of a 
limited partner Ts common law right to sue derivatively, this 
court must be guided by the doctrine that: 
[t]he fundamental consideration which transcends 
all others in regard to the interpretation and 
application of a statute is: What was the intent 
of the legislature? All other rules of statutory 
construction are subordinate to it and are helpful 
only insofar as they assist in attaining that 
obj ect ive. 
Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17 Utah 2d 337, 339, 411 P.2d 
831, 832 (1966) and citations therein; See also, Christensen v. 
Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982); Young v. 
Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108, 110, 433 P.2d 846, 847 (1967). Among the 
"other rules of statutory construction" subordinate to that 
requiring ascertainment of legislative intent is the rule 
advocating a literal application of statutory terms. Thus, it 
has been held that "[i]n the exposition of a statute the 
intention . . . will prevail over the literal sense of the terms; 
and its reason and intention will prevail over the strict 
letter." Young v. Barney, 433 P.2d at 847, (omission original) 
ci ting, Norvill v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P.2d 
937, 126 A.L.R. 1318 (1940). Similarly, in rejecting the result 
apparently mandated by the literal wording of U.C.A. §78-12-35 
(1953) (a provision tolling the statute of limitations on tort 
claims) this Court stated in Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 
255, 390 P.2d 915, 916 (1964) : 
[S]tatutes of necessity must state their 
objectives in general language. It is not always 
possible to foresee and prescribe in precise 
detail for all situations to which they might 
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apply. Attempts to give them universal and 
literal application frequently lead to incongruous 
results which were never intended. When it is 
obvious that this is so, the statute should not be 
so applied. 
Applying these rules to the situation at hand, the questions 
presented are: (1) Did the legislature intend section 48-2-26 
as a bar to a limited p a r t n e r s right to sue derivatively? (2) 
If not, was the trial court Ts "literal" application of the 
statute Ts terms appropriate and in accordance with established 
rules of statutory construction? Plaintiffs will show that 
section 26 was not intended as a bar to derivative actions by 
limited partners and that the trial court Ts interpretation of the 
statute was error as a matter of law. Therefore, the order of 
dismissal should be reversed and this cause remanded for further 
proceedings. 
1. The Legislature Did Not Intend U.C.A. §48-2-26 (1953) As 
A Bar To Derivative Actions By Limited Partners. 
Plaintiffs T research revealed no materials or authority 
concerning the legislative history of the Utah Limited 
Partnership Act as adopted in 1921. L. 1921, Ch. 88, §1 et 
seq. The Act was apparently the result of a verbatim adoption of 
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1916), hereafter the 
"ULPA". For this reason plaintiffs suggest that the history and 
intent behind the Uniform Act provide this court the most 
authoritative guide with which to determine whether U.C.A. 
Section 48-2-26 was intended to abolish the derivative right of 
-24-
1 imi ted partners. 
A review of the background and history of the ULPA reveals 
that section 26 was not intended as a bar to a limited partner fs 
common law right to sue on behalf of the partnership when the 
general partner is unable or unwilling to protect the 
partnership's interests. What seems most likely is that the 
drafters of the ULPA did not foresee the possibility that 
situations such as that at hand might arise and did not 
anticipate the need for derivative protection in the context of 
the limited partnership. 
In 1917 William Draper Lewis, the draftsperson of the 
committee that composed the ULPA, wrote: 
In the limited partnership the limited partner may 
be sure of the active interest of the general 
partners, who are the directors of the enterprise, 
because such partners are, while the directors of 
a corporation are not, liable without limit for 
the debts. 
Lewis, "The Uniform Limited Partnership Act," 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
715, 717 (1917). From this statement it is obvious that the 
drafters of the ULPA did not foresee that situations such as that 
presented here might arise. Because the drafters of the ULPA 
never imagined that a limited partner might have to sue 
derivatively to protect the partnership, they could not have 
intended that Section 26 prohibit such suits. This conclusion is 
supported both by judicial authority and scholarly opinion. See, 
Klebanow v. New York Produce Exchange, 344 F.2d 294, 298 
(2dCir.1965); Comment, 40 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1174, 1176 (1965) 
(Klebanow courts' finding that the draftsmen of the ULPA did not 
foresee the possibility of general/limited partner conflicts in 
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enforcing partnership claims "seems sound"). 
Dean Harold G. Reuschlein contends that the prominence of 
the "aggregate" theory of limited partnership (as opposed to the 
"entity" theory) during the drafting of the ULPA "in and of 
itself serves to explain the absence of a provision authorizing 
derivative suits by limited partners." H.G. Reuschlein, Limi ted 
Partner Derivative Sui ts, 9 St. Mary's L.J. 443 (1978). Under 
either analysis, it is clear that the drafters of the ULPA were 
not thinking of derivative actions when they composed Section 26. 
Since Section 48-2-26 was not intended as a bar to limited 
partners 1 derivative actions, it can be argued that Rule 23.1 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does provide for them. Rule 
23.1 sets forth the requirements of the complaint in a derivative 
action by one or more "members" of an "unincorporated 
association." As the term unincorporated association "includes a 
limited partnership," "Rule 23.1 alone is broad enough in scope" 
to apply to this case. See Reuschlein, supra, 9 St. Mary Ts L.J. 
at 456 through 457. 1 The drafters of the ULPA did not intend 
that Section 26 be applied as a bar to derivative suits. It was 
error to so apply it. 
2. The Three Actual Purposes Of Section 26 Are Reasonably 
Plain And Are Clearly Covered By The Statutory Language. 
Under this analysis, the current inquiry ends here and this case should be remanded for 
a determination of whether plaintiffs have complied with the rule. However, this issue 
was not argued below, and thus plaintiffs turn to the issue of whether Section 48-2-26, 
while not intended to bar derivative suits, should be so applied. To decide this issue, the 
actual purposes of Section 48-2-26 must be ascertained. Then it can be determined 
whether the trial court?s decision was a proper extension of the statute in light of the 
rules of statutory construction. 
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As stated by Judge Friendly in Klebanow v. New York Produce 
Exchange, 344 F.2d at 298, the "true purpose" of section 26 was 
to provide that: 
General partners need not join limited partners in 
an action by the partnership; ordinarily limited 
partners may not sue since this will interfere 
with the management by the general partners . . .; 
a suitor against the partnership need not join a 
limited partner; indeed, he may not do so if the 
partnership be solvent (citations omitted). 
Nowhere in Section 26 is a derivative action by limited partners 
expressly referenced or discussed. The statute does not 
expressly deny a limited partner's right to sue derivatively on 
behalf of the partnership. The issue thus becomes whether the 
intended objectives of the section are such that it should be 
extended to apply to the unforeseen situation where a derivative 
action is needed to protect the partnership. "Ordinarily, courts 
may not extend a statute to meet cases not within its scope or 
purview, however meritorious they may be." Black v. Plumb, 94 
Colo. 318, 29 P.2d 708, 91 ALR 1334 (1934); 73 Am. Jur . 2d 
"Statutes" §149, p. 353. The prohibition against extending a 
statute beyond its intended purpose should weigh even more 
heavily when to do so will result in injustice. 
3. Rules Of Statutory Construction Compel The Conclusion 
That Section 26 Should Not Be Extended To Bar Or Affect A Limited 
Partner's Equitable Right To Protect The Partnership When The 
General Partner Will Not. 
A "statute should be looked at as a whole and in light of 
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the general purpose it was intended to serve; and should be so 
interpreted and applied as to accomplish that objective." Andrus 
v. Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 109, 404 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah, 1965) 
ci ting, Sutherland, Statutory Construction §5002 (3rd Ed. 
1943). One of the primary objectives of the drafters of the ULPA 
was to stimulate and encourage investment in limited partnerships 
by eliminating the technical pitfalls of limited partnerships 
under prior acts. See, Lewis, supra, 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. 715 
(1917). 
In light of this investment policy, it is 
reasonable to assume that the purpose of the 
statute will best be effectuated by limiting the 
application of section [26] to situations where 
general partners are actively interested and suit 
by limited partners would constitute 
interference. To rule otherwise -- forbidding 
limited partners under any circumstances to 
protect their investments -- would discourage 
investment by limited partners. 
Comment, 40 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1174, 1176 (1965). For this court to 
hold that section 26 prohibits a limited partner from protecting 
her investment and partnership rights against the breach of 
fiduciary duty of a corporate general partner would discourage 
investment in limited partnerships, contrary to the objective of 
the ULPA as a whole. This should not be done. 
Next, "a statute is presumed not to be intended to produce 
absurd consequences and [where possible] will be given a 
reasonable and sensible construction." Curt is v. Harmon 
Electronics, Inc. , 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah, 1978). To construe 
section 26 to prohibit derivative suits on behalf of the 
partnership is surely to foster an absurd result. If partners 
may not sue derivatively to protect partnership rights, their 
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most efficient remedy may be an action to dissolve the 
partnership. As one commentator has put it : 
Although a breach of fiduciary duty may give a 
limited partner a cause of action for judicial 
dissolution, [see, U.C.A. §48-2-10(c) (1953)] this 
remedy often will be akin to throwing out the baby 
with the bath water. 
Hecker, "Limited Partners1 Derivative Suits Under the Revised 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act," 33 Vand. L. Rev. 343, 349 
(1980). 
Statutes are not to be deemed to change or repeal the common 
law by implication, unless the intention to do so is obvious. 
Norfolk Redevelopment & Housing Authority v. Chesapeake & Potomac 
Tel. Co., 104 S.Ct. 304 (1983); 73 Am. Jur. 2d, "Statutes" §185 
p. 386. The language of section 26 of the ULPA seems a peculiar 
way to say "A limited partner may not sue derivatively." 
Therefore, the provision should not be construed as implicitly 
abolishing the common law right. 
The "law is presumed to be equitable, and it is a rule of 
construction that any ambiguity in a statute should be resolved 
in favor of an equitable operation of the law." Ker1 in v. Ba11, 
1 Dall (Pa.) 175, 1 L.Ed. 88 (1786); 73 Am. Jur. 2d, "Statutes" 
§259, p. 428. An equitable operation of the law in this case 
requires the court to recognize the right of these plaintiffs to 
sue derivatively to protect the partnership. The general partner 
has openly subordinated the rights of the partnership to those of 
the lenders which control it. As the alter ego for the very 
parties from which redress is owed, the general partner cannot 
act to protect partnership interests. Equity mandates a 
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mechanism whereby the partnership's right to the fiduciary duties 
owed by its general partner can be enforced. Absent a derivative 
suit under these circumstances, any remedy for the partnership is 
imperfect. 
Finally, this Court has a "duty to render such 
interpretation of the laws as will best promote the protection of 
the public." Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d at 
1046. Plaintiffs submit that an interpretation of U.C.A. §48-2-
26 (1953) that will effectively give corporate general partners 
carte blanche to breach their fiduciary duties alone or in 
collusion with third parties will not best promote the protection 
of the publi c. 
In summary, the legislature did not intend to bar derivative 
suits when enacting U.C.A. §48-2-26 (1953). This court should 
not extend the application of the statute, through judicial 
interpretation, to obliterate the common law right of a limited 
partner to protect the partnership when the general partner is 
unable or unwilling to do so. Such an interpretation is contrary 
to the general objective of the statute, will promote absurd 
results, and flies in the face of the demands of equity. The 
Order of Dismissal should be reversed. 
B. Judicial Precedent Supports The Plaintiffs' Position 
That Section 26 Does Not Bar A Limited Partner's Right To Bring A 
Derivative Action When The General Partner Is Unable Or Unwilling 
To Protect The Partnership's Interests. 
-30-
While there is an apparent split of authority as to whether 
statutory provisions identical to section 26 bar a limited 
partner's right to sue derivatively, an analysis of the case law 
reveals that, uniformly, the better reasoned cases have 
recognized that these provisions do not and should not affect 
this r ight. 
The landmark case with respect to the issue is Klebanow v, 
New York Produce Exchange, 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965). In 
Klebanow Judge Friendly posed the "novel" issue before the Second 
Ci rcui t Court of Appeals as: 
[W]hether limited partners of a New York 
partnership in dissolution can sue on its behalf 
for damages claimed to have been inflicted on it 
by conduct proscribed by the federal antitrust 
laws, when the partnership and the liquidating 
partner allegedly have rendered themselves unable 
to sue and their delegate is claimed to be 
unwilling to do so because of affiliations with 
the defendants. 
Id. at 295. The limited partners of Ira Haupt <3c Co. asserted 
that the partnership had a cause of action against the New York 
Produce Exchange for damages resulting from the Produce 
Exchanged alleged attempt to monopolize the cottonseed oil 
market. The original general partners could not bring the action 
because they had transferred all of their powers to an agent of 
the New York Stock Exchange subsequent to Haupt's insolvency. 
The complaint alleged that the Stock Exchanged agent, Mahoney, 
would not sue the Produce Exchange for Haupt because certain 
members of the Stock Exchange had ties to and membership in the 
Produce Exchange. Thus, if the limited partners were precluded 
from suing derivatively by section 115 of the New York 
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Partnership Law (identical to U.C.A. §48-2-26 (1953)) Haupt Ts $11 
million antitrust claim would not have been brought. 
The Klebanow court first recognized the existence of a 
limited partner Ts common law right to sue derivatively, as 
discussed above. Next, the court addressed the issue of whether 
Section 115 precluded the exercise of the right. Noting that the 
framers of the ULPA had not anticipated the issue at hand, the 
court discussed the actual purpose of section 115, which was to 
express the limited liability and the removal from management of 
limited partners. The court continued: 
The words say all this and say it well. But they 
do not have to be read as saying that a limited 
partner cannot bring an action on behalf of the 
partnership when the general partners have 
disabled themselves or wrongfully refused; and 
although they could be so read, we see no 
sufficient reason for doing so when in quite 
similar situations the cestui que trust or the 
preferred stockholder is allowed to do exactly 
that. The predecessor New York statute would 
hardly be read as going so far; we see no basis 
for thinking that, in its effort to achieve 
uniformity with other states, the legislature 
thought it would be altering New York law in this 
respect. 
Id., at 298. Thus, the court implicitly addressed the argument 
discussed above concerning statutory construction and the 
treatment afforded an unanticipated situation to which the 
literal terms of a statute might be applied. 
The court next addressed the defendants 1 argument that the 
legislature had intended the limited partner Ts right to demand 
dissolution as an exclusive remedy. 
" [W] e see no reason why such possibilities should 
prevent the speedier and more effective remedy of 
suit by a limited partner, any more than the 
beneficiary T s right to ask that a trustee be 
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instructed or removed prevents suit by him when 
the trustee has wrongfully refused. 
Id,, at 299. The court noted that the common law right is 
narrowly drawn and requires "strong allegations and proof of 
disqualification or wrongful refusal by the general partners", 
id., but implicitly held that when this self-1imiting test is met 
there is no good reason to impede the limited partner Ts most 
effective means of protecting the partnership and thus, 
indirectly, her interest in the partnership. 
The thoughtful and well reasoned analysis in Klebanow has 
been echoed and supplemented in a number of subsequent cases, 
each holding that provisions identical to section 26 do not bar a 
limited partner Ts right to sue on behalf of the partnership. In 
Smith v. Bader, 458 F.Supp. 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held 
that, under California law, a limited partner may maintain a 
derivative action on behalf of the partnership. Again, the court 
was confronted with the argument that a statute identical to 
U.C.A. §48-2-26 (1953) (i.e., §15526, California Corporations 
Code) prohibited such an action. The court noted that a strict 
interpretation of the statute "is not supported by the 
authorities" and that equity, which supplemented the code in 
cases not provided for by the act, (§15529 Cal. Corp. Code) 
"demands a liberal interpretation of the statute in the absence 
of a direct prohibition of a derivative cause." J_c[., at 1186. 
The court noted that under the facts before it, as in the case 
before this court: 
. . . to preclude the derivative claims would 
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effectively bar the partnership, and possibly the 
limited partners, from obtaining judicial relief 
as a result of the general partner Ts alleged self-
dealing, conversion of assets and opportunities 
and breach of fiduciary duty. Such result would 
be inequi table. 
Id. The court noted that the narrow right of a limited partner 
"is consistent with the purpose of the statute," and that "there 
is nothing to indicate the statute was intended to place 
restrictions upon the judicial remedies afforded limited partners 
in their dealings with the general partner and the 
partnership." _M., at 1186-87. 
In reaffirming the conclusion reached by the Second Circuit 
in Klebanow, the New York Court of Appeals made a point that is 
particularly poignant with respect to the case sub judice: 
"[T]he purpose of [section 26] is solely to restrain limited 
partners from interfering with the right of the general partners 
to carry on the business of the partnership. The basis for this 
lawsuit is that the general partners have declined to carry on 
the business of the partnership by wrongfully refusing to enforce 
a partnership claim ." Riviera Congress Associates v. 
Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ct.App. N.Y. 1966). 
Because the general partner has refused to carry on the 
partnership business, the derivative action is not an 
interference, and the purpose of section 26 is not offended. 
Provisions identical to U.C.A. §48-2-26 (1953) have been 
held not to affect the right of a limited partner to maintain a 
derivative action under the laws of Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan, 
and Ohio. See, Moore v. 1600 Downing St., Ltd., 668 P.2d 16, 19-
20 (Colo. App. 1983); Phillips v. KULA 200, Wick Realty, Inc., 
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629 P.2d 119, 122 (Haw.App. 1981); Jaffe v. Harris, 109 Mich.App. 
786, 312 N.W. 2d 381, 384 (1981); Strain v. Seven Hills 
Associates, 75 A.D.2d 360, 429 N.Y.S.2d 424, 431 (1980) (applying 
Ohio law). 
Finally, District Judge Timothy R. Hanson of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Utah has recognized that U.C.A. §48-2-
26 (1953) does not prohibit a limited partner from suing on 
behalf of the partnership when the general partner is unable or 
unwilling to protect the partnerships interest. In Nagle v. 
Gramco Ltd. Partnership, C-82-9164 (Mem.Op. Feb. 18, 1983) Judge 
Hanson noted that the literal wording of the statute would appear 
to prohibit a limited partnerTs derivative suit. Judge Hanson 
realized, though, that this "was not and is not such as was 
contemplated as a desired result when the Legislature put into 
effect the Utah Limited Partnership Act, particularly Section 48-
2-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended." X£. at 2, R. p. 
239. Plaintiffs respectfully contend that it was this step --
consideration of the legislative intent -- that Judge Daniels 
failed to take, and that this was error. As the Legislature had 
not contemplated the application of section 26 to situations such 
as existed in Nagle (and as exist here) Judge Hanson proceeded to 
determine whether such an application would be appropriate. 
After a careful review of the authorities, Judge Hanson concluded 
"that the application of the basic judicial principles of 
allowing persons to seek redress for wrongs through the courts, 
together with the application of fairness and common sense, 
require that this Court hold with the position enunciated [in 
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Klebanow], together with what appears to be the better reasoned 
treatises on the right of limited partnerships to commence 
actions against third parties where the general partner is unable 
or unwilling to act." J_d. at 3, R. p. 240. 
The cases that have held that a limited partner may not sue 
derivatively because of statutory provisions identical to U.C.A. 
§48-2-26 are remarkable in only one respect -- they have 
uniformly failed to undertake any probing analysis of the statute 
or the ULPA as a whole. Therefore, these cases are unpersuasive. 
The first of these cases is Lieberman v. Atlantic Mutual 
Insurance Co., 385 P.2d 53 (Wash. 1963). The full extent of the 
court fs analysis in Lieberman is that t!a limited partner, not 
being a proper party to a suit brought by the partnership, 
[ci ting, R.C.W. 25.08.260, which is identical to U.C.A. §48-2-
26], rather obviously cannot institute a suit on behalf of the 
limited partnership." Ui_. at 56. The opinion is wholly devoid 
of any analysis of the purpose of the section or of the Act as a 
whole. One other factor that may have influenced the result in 
Lieberman, and the court !s summary disposition of the issue 
therein, is that the plaintiffs in Lieberman were limited 
partners in a partnership whose main asset was a vessel that had 
been deliberately destroyed by the general partner Ts act of 
arson. The limited partners were suing to collect insurance on 
the vessel. The equities in Lieberman were much less compelling 
than in a case where the general partner colludes with third 
parties to subvert partnership rights. 
Several subsequent Washington cases have cited Lieberman for 
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the proposition that a limited partner does not have standing to 
maintain an action on behalf of the partnership. See, American 
Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc., 13 Wash.App. 890, 537 P.2d 
1056 (1975); Fox v. Sackman, 22 Wash.App. 707, 591 P.2d 855 
(1979). Neither of these cases discusses the issue and in both 
the relevant statements are merely dicta. These cases offer no 
rationale to persuade this court to adopt their apparent 
posi tion. , 
A Florida case subject to the same criticism as Fox and 
American Discount Corp. is Amsler v. American Home Assurance Co., 
348 So.2d 68 (Fla. App. 1977). Amsler cites only Lieberman as , 
authority, contains no statutory analysis of its own, and there 
is no hint of any allegation that the general partner was unable 
or unwilling to pursue the claim that was the subject of the , 
act ion. 
A case that has been miscited in support of the proposition 
that a limited partner has no derivative right to sue on behalf
 { 
of the limited partnership is Wroblewski v. Brucher, 550 F.Supp. 
742 (D.C.Okla. 1982). See, e.g. , Yale II Mining Associates v. 
Gilliam, 586 F.Supp. 893, 895 (D.C.Va. 1984); Defendants' Reply , 
Memorandum to Plaintiffs1 Memorandum in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment, Bagley v. Virginia Beach Federal Savings, R. p. 250. 
Reliance on Wroblewski in this regard is embarrassingly
 ( 
misplaced. While the "headnotes" numbered 2, 6 and 9 seem to 
support the proposition that n[u]nder California law, general 
partner ordinarily controls litigation on behalf of limited < 
partnership and limited partner may not intervene on its behalf", 
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550 F.Supp. at 743, hn. 9, the court itself expressly recognizes 
that this statement is dicta only, j_d. at 748, and, in fact, 
states : 
It is settled law that a limited partner in a 
California limited partnership, either by virtue 
of his right to sue the partnership to enforce his 
rights against it, . . . or, by analogy to 
corporate law and the application of general 
equitable principles, . . . would have a right to 
intervene or file a derivative suit in the event 
of fraud or collusion. 
Id. , fn. 8 (statutory references omitted). Thus, Wroblewski, 
cited by defendants, clearly supports the plaintiffs 1 position 
with respect to the issue before this court. 
Similarly, defendants 1 reliance on Bedolla v. Frazer, 52 
Cal.App.3d 118, 125 Cal.Rptr. 50 (1975) in their Reply Memorandum 
below is misplaced. R. p. 250. First, any statement in Bedolla 
concerning a limited partner Ts derivative suit is dictum, as the 
case involved direct claims (brought as a class action) of the 
limited partners against the general partners and third 
parties. Second, the exact statement in Bedolla relevant to the 
instant case is: "While as a general rule a limited partner may 
not bring a lawsuit on behalf of the limited partnership without 
assuming the liability of a general partner . . . ." ]Ld_. a t 6 6 
(emphasis supplied). This statement implicitly supports 
plaintiffs' position. It implies an exception to the "general" 
rule, which plaintiffs respectfully suggest is applicable given 
the circumstances present here. 
Another case in which it is stated that "[t]he only person 
authorized to institute suits on behalf of the limited 
partnership is . the general partner" is Coe v. Uni ted 
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States, 502 F.Supp. 881, 885 (D.C. Ore. 1980). This statement is 
merely dictum in Coe, and is supported only by citation to Fox v. 
Sackman, discussed above. Coe lacks any analysis whatsoever 
which might persuade this court regarding the issue at hand. 
It is held in Yale II Mining Associates v. Gilliam, 586 
F.Supp 893, 895 (D.C. Va.1984) that only a general partner may 
bring suit on behalf of a limited partnership under statutes 
identical to §48-2-26. Again, no statutory analysis is 
undertaken. The Court merely cites Lieberman, Fox, and Coe, 
previously discussed, Conrad Milwaukee Corp. v. Wasilewski, 30 
Wis.2d 481, 483, 141 N.W.2d 240, 242 (1966), which the Yale II 
court itself notes contains only dictum on the issue, and 
Wroblewski, which, as has been previously noted, supports the 
contrary position. Yale II is not a decision that this court 
should rely upon in determining whether Section 26 bars 
derivative actions by limited partners. 
This court should adopt the position of every jurisdiction 
that has thoughtfully considered the issue -- that the statutory 
provision found at U.C.A. § 48-2-26 (1953) does not bar a limited 
partnerTs common law right to sue derivatively on behalf of the 
partnership when the general partner is unable or unwilling to 
protect the partnership's interests. This position is mandated 
by the rules of statutory construction and the requirements of 
equity, fairness and common sense. 
C. The Policy Arguments Most Commonly Made Against The 
Recognition Of A Limited Partners Derivative Right Lack 
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Substance In Light Of The Narrow, Self-Limiting Nature Of The 
Common Law Equitable Right, 
Two policy arguments are commonly made in support of the 
position that a limited partner should not be able to bring a 
derivative action. First, it is argued that a derivative right 
will allow limited partners to interfere with the management of 
the partnership. See Defendants1 Reply Memorandum, R. p. 253. 
Second, it is argued that a derivative right will open the 
floodgate to a torrent of wasteful and unnecessary litigation. 
Id. , R. p. 255. Both of these arguments fail for the same 
reason--they ignore the fact that the common law derivative right 
is by its nature and origin limited to situations where the 
general partner is unable or unwilling to protect the 
partnership^ interests because of fraud, collusion or other 
wrongful conduct by the general partner or the general partner 
and third par ti es. 
Every case that has recognized the common law right has also 
recognized its narrow parameters. See, e.g., Klebanow v. New 
York Produce Exchange, 344 F.2d at 299. See also Wroblewski v. 
Brucher, supra, 550 F.Supp at 748, f.n. 8 (derivative right "in 
the event of fraud or collusion"); Smith v. Bader, 458 F.Supp at 
Plaintiffs recognize that "policy" arguments concerning the ability of limited partners 
to bring derivative actions are properly raised before this court only as they may come in 
to play through the various rules of statutory construction addressed above. Thus, the 
appropriate uses of the arguments addressed herein are in connection with the rules that 
statutes should be construed so that they are internally consistent (interference with 
management argument) and to promote judicial efficiency (wasteful litigation 
argument). Plaintiffs address these arguments in this separate section in order to stress 
that these arguments lack substance because their premises ignore the limited nature of 
the common law right. 
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1186 ("general partnerTs alleged self-dealing, conversion of 
assets and opportunities and breach of fiduciary duty"); Moore v. 
1600 Downing St, , Ltd. , 668 P.2d at 19 (derivative action for 
breach of fiduciary duty by general partners "if the general 
partners refuse to or are unable to bring such an action"); 
Phillips v. KULA 200, Wick Realty, Inc., 629 P.2d at 122 ("if the 
limited partnership refuses to bring an action for damages 
against its general partners"); Jaffe v. Harris, 312 N.W.2d at 
383 (implicitly; complaint alleged conversion, self-dealing and 
breach of fiduciary duty by general partner); Riviera Congress 
Associates v. Yassky, 223 N.E.2d at 879 (derivative action 
allowed to enforce partnership claims "when those in control of 
the business wrongfully decline to do so"); Strain v. Seven Hills 
Associates, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 425 (implicitly; complaint alleged 
breach of fiduciary duty of general partner by subjecting 
economic well being of partnership to non-partnership interests 
independently owned by general partner); Nagle v. Gramco Limited 
Partnership, at 3, R. p. 239, (unreasonable to deny derivative 
relief "where the general partner and [a third party] acting in 
concert or otherwise are damaging limited partners"). 
The derivative action is a narrow exception to the general 
rule prohibiting interference with the management of an entity, 
whether it be a corporation, trust, or limited partnership. The 
ability to bring a derivative action is, inherently, a very 
narrow right. Thus, the recognition of this right will not lead 
to a flood of spurious litigation intended to harass or interfere 
with the management of limited partnerships. 
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Incidentally, plaintiffs note that the circumstances in 
which derivative actions are appropriate break down into two 
general categories. The first is where the partnership has a 
claim against the general partner for a breach of its fiduciary 
duty or some other misconduct that has damaged the partnership. 
In this case the derivative action is appropriate because the 
general partner is obviously not going to sue itself. This 
situation is present in the instant case. The second category 
exists where the partnership has claims or defenses against a 
third party, but the claims are not being asserted because the 
general partner is disabled or has ties to the third party that 
make it either unable or unwilling to do so. Under these 
circumstances the derivative action must be supported by "strong 
allegations" specifying the reasons why the general partner 
cannot or will not act. This situation is also present in the 
instant case. Plaintiffs have met the test involved in the 
second category through their specific pleadings alleging that 
JSC, the general partner, is actually the alter ego of the 
lenders, and by setting forth specific facts supporting this 
allegation. There was no assertion in the court below, nor can 
there be in this appeal, that the partnership failed to plead 
facts to state a claim against the general partner and the 
lenders that control it. Defendants claimed only that the 
limited partners could not pursue partnership claims derivatively 
on its behalf. For the purposes of this appeal, the sufficiency 
of plaintiffs 1 allegations is established. 
The "policy" objections commonly made in regard to the 
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recognition of a limited partner's narrow derivative right are 
based upon a misconception of the limited nature of the right. 
The objections are ill-founded and should be disregarded by this 
court in determining whether U.C.A. § 48-2-26 bars a limited 
partner's common law right to sue on behalf of the partnership 
when the general partner is unable or unwilling to protect the 
partnership's interests. Indeed, given the equities involved, 
this is one "floodgate" which should be kept open to protect 
limited partnerships and their partners. 
CONCLUSION 
Is there a right without a remedy? Confronted by this 
question in the context of maladministration, breach of fiduciary 
duty and fraud or collusion by a general partner in a limited 
partnership setting, numerous courts have answered nno". The 
remedy is the derivative action, recognized at common law under 
circumstances where limited partners can demonstrate fraud, 
collusion, self dealing, disability or other breaches of 
fiduciary duty on the part of the general partner at the expense 
of the partnership. This common law rule of equity has its roots 
in similar actions historically recognized with respect to 
corporate shareholders and trust beneficiaries. 
Parties opposing the derivative right of limited partners to 
sue on behalf of a limited partnership under these circumstances 
have asserted as a bar the provisions of statutes similar or 
identical to 48-2-26 U.C.A. (1953). However, the legislative 
history of the ULPA does not support the conclusion that this 
section was intended to bar derivative actions brought by limited 
partners under appropriate circumstances. Nor do other rules of 
statutory construction support such a finding. The courts which 
have discussed these issues have concluded that the statute is 
not a bar to derivative actions by limited partners under 
appropriate circumstances. The decisions which have held to the 
contrary have uniformly failed to discuss the issues and have 
failed to provide any rationale to support their intepretation of 
the statute. 
Under the circumstances of this case, The Jeremy, Ltd. will 
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be irreparably damaged and without a remedy unless this court 
recognizes the right of its limited partners to sue the 
wrongdoers on its behalf through the vehicle of this derivative 
suit. Equity, common sense and public policy require this 
result. The general partner here will not sue itself nor the 
lenders which own and control it. 
The arguments which have been raised to oppose the 
derivative right of limited partners under these circumstances 
are not meritorious. Courts which have recognized the derivative 
right have also circumscribed it with requirements that the 
plaintiffs make a showing that the general partner is disabled or 
otherwise wrongfully failing to act to protect partnership 
interests. Unwarranted interference in the management of limited 
partnerships is contrained because of the narrow scope of the 
derivative action. Because of this same limited scope, the 
recognition of a derivative right in limited partners will not 
open the "floodgates" to unwarranted litigation. 
While the provisions of Section 26 could be read to prohibit 
derivative actions by limited partners, it is clear that they 
need not be and it is further clear that they should not be under 
the better reasoned authority and circumstances of this case. 
The Order of Dismissal should be reversed and this case 
should be remanded for further proceedings in the District Court. 
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DATED this 21 w( day of January, 1987. 
Jeftltiejr L. S fives tr ini 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Plainti ffs/Appellants 
Bagley Corporation and Gerald H* Bagley 
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c o p i e s of t h e f o r e g o i n g BRIEF OF APPELLANT were m a i l e d , p o s t a g e 
f u l l y p r e p a i d , on the c 4 3 day of J a n u a r y , 1987 t o each of 
t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
George A. Hunt Bruce A. Maak 
Stephen Roth 185 South State, Suite 1500 
R. Scott Howell Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU Attorney for Associated Title Co. 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. O Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
R. Dennis Ickes 
R. DENNIS ICKES, P C . 
200 North Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Attorney for Jeremy Service 
Corporation and The Jeremy, 
Ltd. 
James S. Jar dine 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for William T. Blair, Jr. 
M. David Eckersley, Esq. 
HOUPT, ECKERSLEY <Sc DOWNES 
419 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendants 
Bandy, Knickerbocker, May, 
Poulton, Livingstone and 
Rutherford 
Carol Goodman, Esq. 
David M. Connors, Esq. 
Joseph M. Hepworth, Esq. 
LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY <3c MacRAE 
1000 Kearns Building 
136 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff in 
Intervention, Merrill Lynch 
Private Capital, Inc. 
k 
vic/Bagley25 
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GEORGE A. HUNT (A1586) 
STEPHEN ROTH (A2808) 
R. SCOTT HOWELL (A4056) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BAGLEY CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and GERALD H. 
BAGLEY, an individual, 
individually and derivatively 
for and on behalf of THE 




VIRGINIA BEACH FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a foreign 
corporation, GUARANTY NORTHSTATE, 
fka NORTHSTATE SAVINGS AND LOAN 
OF SOUTHERN PINES, a foreign 
corporation, ATLANTIC PERMANENT 
FEDERAL, a foreign corporation 
JEFFERSON SAVINGS S. LOAN, a 
foreign corporation, WILLIAM T. 
BLAIR, JR., WILLIAM H. BANDY, 
HARRY H. KNICKERBOCKER, T. 
LINWOOD MAY, NANCY BOLTEN, 
JOHN LIVINGSTONE and J. 
RUTHERFORD, individuals, THE 
JEREMY LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership, JEREMY SERVICE 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, 
and ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
OF 
DISMISSAL 
N o . • • • • • . . „ 
F I L E D 
J!)!. 31936 
Clerk of Summit County 
**;:..„ , .<p 
Deputy Clerk 
C i v i l No. 8725 
mm ' PIRF^QR 
The Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Virginia Beach 
Federal Savings & Loan Association, Atlantic Permanent 
Federal Savings & Loan Association, North State Savings & Loan 
of Southern Pines and Jefferson Savings & Loan Association 
("Lenders") having come on regularly for hearing before the 
above-entitled Court on Friday, May 30, 1986, at the hour of 
2:00 p.m., Jeffery L. Silvestrini of Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
appearing for Plaintiffs, George A. Hunt of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau appearing for Lenders, M. David Eckersley of Houpt 
and Eckersley appearing for the individual Defendants (except 
Mr. Blair) and R. Dennis Ickes appearing for Defendants Jeremy 
Service Corporation and The Jeremy Ltd., and the Court having 
heard the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the Memoranda 
and other pleadings on file, and Messrs. Eckersley and Ickes 
having stated to the Court that their clients joined in the 
motion of Lenders, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises and good cause appearing, 
Now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that: 
1. The Motion to Dismiss shall be and the same hereby 
is granted; 
2. All Plaintiffs1 claims of a derivative nature 
against Defendants or any of them (claims 1-9 and 12-15 inclu-
sive) shall be and the same are hereby dismissed; 
' -2-
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3. Any remaining claims of Plaintiffs, if any , which 
are either direct claims or claims where the object is to 
enforce a limited partner's right against or liability to the 
partnership , shall be re-pleaded by way of Amended Complaint, 
the same to be filed within forty (40) days from entry hereof; 
4. With respect to the claims dismissed under Paragraph 
numbered 2 above, there is no just reason for delay and said 
judgment of dismissal shall be deemed final in accordance with 
Rule 54(b)# Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED and entered this J (*> day of June, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
rX^L~3 ^c .^fi/1 
>cott Daniels 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By. 
George A. Hunt 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
BOOKZPAGFi.00 
HOUPT & ECKERSLEY 
By. 
M. David Eckersley 
R. Dennis Ickes 
State of Utah ) 
County of Summit ) 
I, OouglM a Gaaiy, Cltrk of f i t DWriot Court ki and for 
Summit County, Stat* of Utah, do honey oarMy fwt tho 
oftha foregoing * * WL*rut and oomct copy < 
gjsistei. y w ^ n / ^ sf^ 
in th* maoar of tfw anttttad _ £ - L . 
9513 
as th* n m * appoam of raoord and upon Main myofftoa. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I ham haraumo aat my hand and 
affix th* aaal of taW Court 1n*U*£day of &% lft£a? ffi  t a l f aaid rt W a ^ d a y f ^ f f IfU  
; iWftff4f* Ai Wfrt'tf- Oic 
By S f f f i ^ rtw-vT^ Daputy Cleric 
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